Case Facts
In this case, on Sunday 10 November 1607 (Michaelmas Term, 5 James I), Archbishop Bancroft of Canterbury made a complaint to King James I concerning prohibitions issued by the common law courts. Bancroft informed the King that ecclesiastical causes could be decided by the King himself in his Royal person, and that the judges of England were merely his delegates, capable of being removed at his pleasure. A prior controversy concerning land between private parties had also been heard by the King personally, with sentence given — a decision which had subsequently been repealed on the ground that the matter belonged to the common law courts. These events prompted King James I to assert the right to sit in personal judgement on legal causes.
Coke CJ, in the presence of and with the clear consent of all the Judges of England and Barons of the Exchequer, disputed this claim. Coke replied that the King in his own person cannot adjudge any case — whether criminal, such as treason or felony, or between party and party concerning inheritance, chattels, or goods — but that all such matters ought to be determined and adjudged in the established courts of justice according to the law and custom of England.
The King responded by asserting that he and others possessed reason just as well as the judges. Coke answered that causes touching the life, inheritance, goods, or fortunes of subjects are not to be decided by natural reason but by the artificial reason and judgement of law, which requires long study and experience before a man can attain to the cognizance of it. Coke described the law as the "golden met-wand and measure to try the causes of the subjects", and observed that it protected His Majesty in safety and peace.
The King was greatly offended and stated that to affirm he was under the law would amount to treason. Coke responded by citing the maxim drawn from Bracton: quod Rex non debet esse sub homine, sed sub Deo et lege — that the King ought not to be under any man, but under God and the law. The same principle was further recorded with reference to Bracton and Fleta: Rex habet superiores in regno Deum et legem (the King has in his realm God and the law as his superiors).
Coke also relied on several statutory authorities in support of the position that no person may be judged except in the courts of justice according to the law of the land, including Magna Carta cap. 29, 2 Ed. 3 cap. 9, 25 Ed. 3 cap. 5, 43 Ed. 3 cap. 3, and 4 H. 4 cap. 22.
Held
It was held that the King cannot personally adjudge any case — criminal or civil — and that all such matters must be determined in the established courts of justice according to the law and custom of England. Whilst the King may sit in the King's Bench, the Court itself gives the judgement: all judgements are given ideo consideratum est per Curiam (it is therefore considered by the Court). No King after the Conquest assumed to give any judgement in any cause concerning the administration of justice within the realm.
Furthermore, it was confirmed that the King cannot arrest any man, because if it were a wrong to the party grieved, he could have no remedy against the King; likewise, if the King were to give any judgement personally, the injured party would have no remedy. This absence of remedy itself demonstrated the constitutional impropriety of personal royal adjudication.
The King's supreme judicial role is acknowledged only in the Upper House of Parliament, where, sitting with his Lords, he acts as the supreme judge: errors in the Court of Common Pleas may be corrected in the King's Bench, and errors in the King's Bench may be reversed in the Upper House of Parliament by the King with the assent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal.
Ratio Decidendi
The ratio decidendi of this case is that the King, acting in his personal capacity, has no authority to decide legal causes — whether criminal or civil. Such causes must be adjudicated in the courts of justice according to the law and custom of England. This principle rests on the distinction between the exercise of natural reason and the application of the artificial reason of the law, which is the product of long study and experience and is properly the domain of trained judges, not of the sovereign acting personally.
The position was grounded not merely in common law tradition but also in statutory authority, including Magna Carta cap. 29, which guarantees that no person shall be deprived of their rights except by the lawful judgement of their peers or by the law of the land. Coke's invocation of Bracton's maxim — quod Rex non debet esse sub homine, sed sub Deo et lege — placed the rule of law above the personal authority of the sovereign, establishing the foundational constitutional principle that even the King is subject to the law.
This case is regarded as a cornerstone of the rule of law, judicial independence, and the separation of powers in English constitutional law. It has been cited in conjunction with the Case of Proclamations [1610] as establishing the constitutional limits of royal prerogative in matters of law and governance. It is also contrasted with cases such as Entick v Carrington [1765], which affirmed that the executive may not act without lawful authority, and M v Home Office [1994], which confirmed that the rule of law binds the Crown and its ministers.
Obiter Dicta
Not applicable.