Case Facts
The claimant was employed by the defendant company as a member of staff. Following a dispute with her manager (referred to in the proceedings as W), a physical altercation occurred in which W took hold of the claimant's arms. A struggle ensued, during which the claimant fell and sustained injuries. Her employment was subsequently formally terminated.
The claimant brought proceedings against the defendant, alleging that it was vicariously liable for the intentional torts committed by W — specifically, assault and battery, and false imprisonment. She contended that the incident had caused her to develop serious and debilitating psychological conditions, including depression and agoraphobia, amounting to a near-complete psychiatric breakdown, which had rendered her unable to work.
Two psychiatrists gave evidence on the claimant's behalf at first instance. The first psychiatrist (Psychiatrist A) took the view that the claimant's psychiatric problems would have manifested in any event, regardless of the assault, but that the assault had accelerated their onset. The second psychiatrist (Psychiatrist B) expressed the view that the problems would not have manifested, or would not have manifested so severely, but for the assault. The trial judge found in the claimant's favour on the question of liability, rejecting the defendant's argument that contributory negligence had played a role, and awarded damages on the basis of the assault being the full cause of the claimant's psychiatric state. The defendant appealed.
Held
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part.
On the contributory negligence ground, the appeal was dismissed. The court held that the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 does not apply to claims founded on the intentional torts of assault and battery. Accordingly, a defendant cannot invoke contributory negligence as a basis for reducing damages in such cases. The trial judge had been correct to refuse any reduction on this ground.
On the psychiatric causation ground, the appeal was allowed. The court found that the trial judge had erred in failing to give adequate reasons for accepting Psychiatrist A's general evidence while simultaneously rejecting the specific finding of that same expert — namely, that the assault had merely accelerated, rather than caused, the psychiatric condition. Having preferred the evidence of Psychiatrist A over that of Psychiatrist B on the whole, the judge was required to grapple with and explain her departure from Psychiatrist A's conclusions on causation. That failure rendered the reasoning defective.
The court directed that the correct finding was that the assault had accelerated by one to two years a psychiatric state which the claimant would have reached in any event. As a result of this partial allowance, the following heads of damages were reduced: (a) general damages for pain, suffering and distress; (b) loss of future earnings; (c) care costs; and (d) damages for future handicap in the open labour market.
Reeves v Police of the Metropolis [1999] and other cases were applied. Lane v Holloway [1968] and some other cases were not followed.
Ratio Decidendi
The ratio of this decision comprises two distinct propositions.
First, the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 does not permit a reduction in damages on grounds of contributory negligence where the cause of action is founded on the intentional torts of assault and battery. The Act is concerned with fault in the sense of negligence or breach of a duty of care, and its apportionment mechanism is conceptually incompatible with a claim resting on the deliberate and unlawful application of force to the person of another. A defendant who commits an intentional wrong of this nature cannot call upon the statutory machinery of the 1945 Act to diminish the damages otherwise payable to the victim.
Second, where a trial judge has determined, on the basis of competing expert evidence, to prefer the evidence of one expert over another, the judge is bound to engage consistently with that preferred expert's conclusions on all material issues. Where the preferred expert's evidence contains a specific finding on causation — here, that the assault accelerated rather than caused the psychiatric condition — the judge must either accept that finding or give clear and adequate reasons for departing from it. Failing to do so constitutes an error of law. The appropriate conclusion on the facts, consistent with the evidence of the preferred expert, was that the defendant's wrongdoing had accelerated the claimant's psychiatric deterioration by one to two years, not that it had brought about that deterioration in its entirety.
Obiter Dicta
Not applicable.