Case Facts
The national coal strike commenced on 1 April 1921. The appellants, Glasbrook Bros Ltd, were the owners of collieries near Swansea — specifically the Garngoch and Cape Collieries at Gorseinon, Glamorganshire. When the strike ended on 4 July 1921, the appellants proposed to pay their miners on the agreed scale, but the miners refused to return to work. A particular concern arose in the week of 4 July 1921 regarding the safety men: these were workers employed to operate the pumping machinery that prevented flooding of the mine. Without their continued work, the mine risked becoming unworkable for a considerable period. The striking miners exerted pressure on the safety men to cease work, and on 9 July 1921 the safety men did not report for duty, causing pumping to be discontinued.
The colliery manager, Mr James, urgently sought police protection and insisted that a resident garrison of 100 police officers be billeted at the collieries. However, the police superintendent, Lt-Col Smith, took the view that he could adequately protect the collieries using a mobile patrol without the need for a garrison. Despite his professional assessment that a garrison was unnecessary, Lt-Col Smith ultimately agreed to provide 70 officers on the condition that a written requisition be signed and that payment be promised. Mr James signed the requisition on 9 July 1921, guaranteeing payment for the special duty of a superintendent, two inspectors, two sergeants, and 66 constables at the two collieries. The police authority brought in the 70 officers from other divisions without reducing police protection elsewhere in the district. Following the billeting of the police garrison, the safety men returned to work; fires were re-lit on 15 July 1921 and pumping resumed. The garrison remained in place until the dispute was settled.
The respondent police authority, Glamorgan County Council, subsequently brought an action to recover £2,200 11s 10d for the services rendered under the agreement. The appellants counter-claimed for £1,330 in respect of amounts paid for housing and billeting the police. The appellants advanced two arguments in defence: first, that there was no consideration for the agreement because the police were merely performing their existing public duty; and second, that the agreement had been made under compulsion and was contrary to public policy.
At first instance, Bailhache J held that the appellants had requested special protection in excess of what the police were prepared to provide as sufficient, and that the express promise to pay was therefore valid. The Court of Appeal affirmed this decision, with Bankes and Scrutton LJJ in the majority and Atkin LJ dissenting. The appellants appealed to the House of Lords.
Held
The House of Lords dismissed the appeal by a majority of 3:2, affirming the decision of the Court of Appeal.
The majority held that the true inference to be drawn from the evidence was that the garrison was an additional — rather than a substituted or alternative — means of protection, and that the safety of the mine could have been secured without it. The police superintendent had himself considered a mobile patrol to be sufficient. Because the garrison went beyond what the police authority considered necessary to discharge its absolute public duty, it constituted a special service requested by the appellants. The police authority was therefore entitled to charge for that service, and there was ample consideration for the promise of payment. The agreement was further held not to be void on grounds of public policy.
Ratio Decidendi
The central legal principle established by this case concerns the relationship between an existing public duty and the doctrine of consideration in contract law. The House of Lords confirmed that the police are subject to an absolute and unconditional obligation to take all steps they consider necessary for keeping the peace, preventing crime, and protecting property from criminal injury. The public cannot be charged for the discharge of that absolute duty; the cost is borne collectively through rates and taxes, and individual members of the public are entitled to protection as of right.
However, the majority drew a clear distinction between that absolute duty and services that go beyond it. Where a private person desires special police services — services that exceed what the police authority itself considers necessary to fulfil its public obligations, though remaining within its lawful powers — the police authority may provide those services in consideration of payment. Crucially, provided the arrangement does not interfere with the discharge of ordinary police duties elsewhere, such a transaction is supported by valid consideration: the police authority is doing something more than it is legally bound to do, and that additional performance is sufficient to constitute good consideration.
An equally important aspect of the ratio is that it is for the police authority, and not the requesting private party, to determine whether a particular service falls within its absolute duty or constitutes a special service beyond that duty. The assessment of what is necessary for the protection of life and property is a matter for the professional judgement of the police, not for the person making the request.
This case is closely related to the principle articulated in Collins v Godefroy (1831), which holds that performance of an existing public duty cannot amount to consideration. The decision in this case refines that principle by making clear that exceeding the scope of the existing public duty — as determined by the public authority itself — does provide valid consideration for a private promise of payment.
Obiter Dicta
Not applicable.