Case Facts
The claimant was sunbathing on a piece of grass in the car park of the Ponosmere Hotel at Perranporth, Cornwall, on 10 July 1957. The defendant drove his Jaguar motor car over her legs, not having seen her. At first instance, the court found that negligence had been proved against the defendant and that the claimant was not guilty of contributory negligence, assessing general damages at £500 (with costs bringing the total award to £575).
The claimant issued her writ on 2 February 1961, more than three years after the accident. She pleaded both negligence and, in the alternative, trespass to the person. The particulars pleaded under the trespass claim simply repeated those pleaded under negligence. The claimant conceded that her cause of action in negligence was statute-barred by the three-year limitation period applicable to personal injury actions under the proviso to s 2(1)(a) Limitation Act 1939 as inserted by s 2(1) of the Law Reform (Limitation of Actions, etc) Act 1954. Without that proviso, the general limitation period for tort claims under the Limitation Act 1939 was six years. The claimant argued, however, that her claim in trespass to the person survived under that longer six-year period.
At first instance, Elwes J accepted this argument, held that the trespass claim was not barred by the three-year limitation period, and awarded the claimant £575 in damages. The defendant appealed to the Court of Appeal.
Held
The Court of Appeal reversed the first-instance decision of Elwes J and dismissed the claimant's action. The court held that where personal injury is caused unintentionally, the claimant's only cause of action lies in negligence, not in trespass to the person. Because the negligence claim was conceded to be statute-barred under the three-year limitation period introduced by the Law Reform (Limitation of Actions, etc) Act 1954, the action could not succeed.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeal held that even if the cause of action were properly characterised as trespass to the person, the words "breach of duty" in the proviso to s 2(1) of the Limitation Act 1939 (as inserted by the Law Reform (Limitation of Actions, etc) Act 1954) were wide enough to cover trespass to the person. Accordingly, the trespass claim would in any event have been subject to the three-year limitation period, and the claimant's action would have been time-barred on either analysis.
Ratio Decidendi
The ratio decidendi of this case comprises two distinct limbs, both of which were accepted by the full court.
First limb: Where personal injury is caused unintentionally, the claimant's cause of action lies in negligence alone and not in trespass to the person. Trespass to the person, as a cause of action for personal injury, is confined to intentional acts. Because the defendant's act in driving over the claimant's legs was unintentional, the only available cause of action was negligence. This is the formulation adopted by Lord Denning MR and Danckwerts LJ. Diplock LJ expressed the same conclusion in slightly different terms: where the facts give rise to a cause of action, the preferable legal description of that cause of action on these facts was negligence rather than trespass, though his reasoning did not entirely foreclose the theoretical availability of trespass.
Second limb: Even if the cause of action were properly characterised as trespass to the person, the phrase "breach of duty" in the proviso to s 2(1) of the Limitation Act 1939, as inserted by s 2(1) of the Law Reform (Limitation of Actions, etc) Act 1954, is wide enough to encompass a claim in trespass to the person. Accordingly, a claimant seeking to recover damages for personal injury caused by an unintentional act would be subject to the three-year limitation period whether the claim is framed in negligence or in trespass to the person.
The combined effect of these two limbs is that a claimant cannot circumvent the three-year limitation period for personal injury actions by framing a claim arising from an unintentional act as trespass to the person rather than negligence.
Obiter Dicta
In the course of his judgement, Lord Denning MR made an observation on statutory construction that, whilst not forming part of the ratio, has attracted attention in subsequent academic commentary. He stated that it is permissible to look at a committee report that preceded a piece of legislation in order to identify the mischief at which the statute was directed. However, it is not permissible to interpret the actual words of the statute according to the recommendations contained in that report. This draws a clear distinction between using pre-legislative materials to identify legislative purpose and using them to determine the meaning of the statutory language itself, a distinction consistent with the approach outlined in Assam Railways and Trading Co Ltd v Inland Revenue Comrs [1934].