Case Facts
The claimant, Bradford Corporation, had been authorised by the Bradford Corporation Waterworks Act 1854 to purchase the undertaking of the Bradford Waterworks Company, which had acquired the exclusive right to springs and streams arising or flowing through a farm known as Trooper Farm. Through this statutory scheme, the Corporation had come to rely upon percolating underground water drawn from the area for the town's water supply. Critically, however, the Corporation had acquired no proprietary interest in the water beneath the land of the defendant, Fred Pickles.
Pickles owned a farm on higher ground immediately adjoining Trooper Farm. He had been advised that substantial quantities of stone and minerals on his farm could be profitably worked if the land were adequately drained — and that such drainage could be achieved without the considerable expense of pumping engines, provided the natural water percolating through the land was diverted. Pickles accordingly carried out works on his own land which had the effect of diverting percolating underground water — that is, water moving through the ground without flowing in any defined channel or underground stream — thereby diminishing the supply of water that Bradford Corporation had previously been drawing for the benefit of the town.
Bradford Corporation contended that Pickles's true and dominant motive was not the legitimate working of minerals but rather to coerce the Corporation into purchasing his water rights at his own price. The Corporation brought an action seeking an injunction to restrain Pickles from continuing the diversion. At first instance, North J granted the injunction. On appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed that decision. Bradford Corporation appealed further to the House of Lords.
Held
The House of Lords held unanimously that Bradford Corporation's claim failed. Since Pickles possessed a legal right to divert percolating water under his own land, his alleged malicious or improper motive could not render that otherwise lawful act unlawful. No injunction could be granted.
The Corporation advanced two principal arguments. First, it argued that the common law afforded it some protection against the interference with its water supply. This argument was decisively rejected by reference to the earlier House of Lords decision in Chasemore v Richards [1859], which had already established that a landowner is entitled to sink a well and abstract percolating subterranean water regardless of his object or purpose, and even if that purpose is wholly unconnected with the enjoyment of his own estate. Without consideration of the statutory argument, the common law case was described as absolutely hopeless in light of that authority.
Second, the Corporation relied upon s 49 of the Bradford Corporation Waterworks Act 1854, which prohibited any person from diverting, altering, or diminishing the waters of the 'Many Wells' springs. This argument was also rejected. The provision was construed as protecting only those waters in which the Corporation had itself acquired a proprietary right by purchase, compensation, or otherwise. Since the Corporation had never acquired any such right over the water beneath Pickles's land, the section offered it no assistance. Furthermore, the section penalised only an illegal diversion, and Pickles's act of diversion was not illegal.
Ratio Decidendi
The legal principle established by this case is that no use of property which would be lawful if carried out with a proper motive can become unlawful merely because it is prompted by a motive that is improper, selfish, or malicious. Where a defendant exercises a legal right over his own land, the law is not concerned with the motive that underlies the exercise of that right.
This principle rests upon the foundation laid in Chasemore v Richards [1859], which had settled that a landowner's right to abstract percolating subterranean water from beneath his own land is absolute and is not qualified by considerations of purpose or intent. The characterisation of the water as percolating water — as distinct from water flowing in a defined underground channel — was therefore central to the legal analysis, since it brought the facts squarely within the rule in Chasemore v Richards [1859]. Had the water flowed in a defined underground stream to which riparian rights attached, different considerations might have applied.
The consequence of this principle in the law of tort is significant: malice or bad faith on the part of a defendant cannot transform an otherwise lawful act into an actionable wrong. The existence of a legal right is a complete answer to any claim founded upon the defendant's exercise of that right, however unmeritorious his motivation may be.
Obiter Dicta
The case was subsequently applied in Allen v Flood (1898)and was considered in Hollywood Silver Fox Farm Ltd v Emmett [1936], where the court addressed the question whether malicious intent could be relevant in other areas of tort, particularly in the context of private nuisance. The distinction drawn in that later case — where malice was held to be relevant to liability for nuisance caused by the deliberate firing of guns to frighten foxes on a neighbouring property — illustrates that the principle in this case is not without qualification. The significance of this case lies in its foundational role in establishing the general position that motive is ordinarily irrelevant to the lawfulness of an act that is otherwise within a person's legal rights, a doctrine that has had lasting influence across the law of tort and property.