Case Facts
Nathan Lithman acquired a sub-lease exceeding sixty years of property in Ellen Street and Berners Street, Stepney, paying £5,500, without knowledge that the London County Council had resolved to deal with the area by means of an improvement scheme under the Housing Acts 1890 to 1921. An improvement scheme was made by the London County Council in or about 1922 and confirmed by the Minister of Health. Lithman appeared at the public inquiry but raised no real objection, anticipating that he would receive compensation. The arbitrator's award, however, assessed compensation at nil.
The London County Council's powers of compulsory purchase subsequently lapsed, not by reason of any statutory provision, but because more than three years elapsed after confirmation of the order before those powers were exercised. Following that lapse, the London County Council made a fresh order under Part I of the Housing Act 1930. A local inquiry was held at which objections were raised on behalf of Lithman, but the Minister confirmed the order declaring the area a clearance area.
Ellen Street Estates Ltd, as assignees of Lithman, applied under s 11 Housing Act 1930 as persons aggrieved to quash the confirmed order on the ground that the Minister lacked jurisdiction to confirm it. Swift J dismissed the application at first instance, and Ellen Street Estates Ltd appealed to the Court of Appeal.
The central statutory conflict arose between two pieces of legislation. Section 7(1) Acquisition of Land (Assessment of Compensation) Act 1919 provides that the provisions of any Act or order by which land is authorised to be acquired "shall, in relation to the matters dealt with in this Act, have effect subject to this Act, and so far as inconsistent with this Act those provisions shall cease to have or shall not have effect." The appellants argued that this wording meant Parliament had effectively entrenched the 1919 Act, so that any subsequent statutory inconsistency could only override it by express repeal. Against this, s 46 Housing Act 1925 prescribed a materially different basis for assessing compensation for land compulsorily acquired under improvement or reconstruction schemes — namely, site value cleared of buildings — which was inconsistent with the open market value basis established by s 2 Acquisition of Land (Assessment of Compensation) Act 1919. The appellants further argued that s 64 Housing Act 1930 had preserved the earlier improvement scheme. The appellants also contended that clause 3 of the confirming order, which incorporated the Acquisition of Land (Assessment of Compensation) Act 1919 as modified by the Housing Act 1930, was ultra vires.
Held
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. The court held on two distinct grounds. First, Parliament cannot bind itself as to the form of subsequent legislation and cannot effectively enact that a provision in one statute shall not be altered by a subsequent Act save by express words. Second, s 46 Housing Act 1925, so far as its provisions are inconsistent with those of the Acquisition of Land (Assessment of Compensation) Act 1919, had repealed by implication the provisions of that Act. The attempt in s 7(1) Acquisition of Land (Assessment of Compensation) Act 1919 to entrench itself against implied repeal was therefore of no legal effect.
The court also held that the local authority was not precluded by the lapse of the 1922 scheme from making a fresh scheme under the Housing Act 1930, nor was the Minister precluded from confirming it. The argument that s 64 Housing Act 1930 preserved the earlier improvement scheme was rejected. The decision in Vauxhall Estates v Liverpool Corporation [1932] was approved and followed.
Ratio Decidendi
The ratio of this case is the confirmation and application of the doctrine of implied repeal as a necessary corollary of parliamentary sovereignty. Parliament, as a sovereign legislature, cannot bind its successors as to the manner and form in which future legislation must be enacted. Consequently, where a later Act of Parliament is inconsistent with an earlier Act, the later Act repeals the earlier one by implication, irrespective of any provision in the earlier Act purporting to require that it can only be displaced by express words.
The specific manifestation of this principle was the relationship between the Acquisition of Land (Assessment of Compensation) Act 1919 and s 46 Housing Act 1925. The language of s 7(1) Acquisition of Land (Assessment of Compensation) Act 1919 — purporting to make the Act's provisions override any inconsistent provisions in subsequent legislation — could not achieve its stated purpose. Parliament in 1919 could not, by the use of such language, constrain the legislative freedom of subsequent Parliaments. When Parliament enacted s 46 Housing Act 1925 with provisions inconsistent with the 1919 Act, the doctrine of implied repeal dictated that the later provision prevailed. The 1919 Act was accordingly repealed by implication to the extent of that inconsistency.
This case sits alongside Vauxhall Estates v Liverpool Corporation [1932] as one of the foundational authorities for the proposition that Parliament cannot entrench legislation against implied repeal in the manner and form sense, and for the principle that parliamentary sovereignty requires each Parliament to remain free to legislate as it sees fit, unconstrained by the attempted self-binding of its predecessors.
Obiter Dicta
Not applicable.