Case Facts
The claimant brought an action in libel arising from a publication in the Morning Post newspaper. The publication referred to a "nest of hornets" of "notorious swindlers and common informers" who gathered at a house in the corner of the King's Road. Through innuendos contained in the declaration, this address was identified as the claimant's dwelling-house. The publication further described "the head of the gang" as possessing "the attribute of a gentleman, called the Devil, who first seduces, then stimulates, and at last deceives," and made reference to "Polyphemus the man-eater" with "but one eye," as well as an allusion to "a certain noble circumnavigator." Each of these descriptions was connected by innuendo to the plaintiff, W. J'Anson.
The defendant pleaded justification, alleging that the claimant had been illegally, fraudulently, and dishonestly concerned and connected with a gang of swindlers and common informers, and had been guilty of deceiving and defrauding divers persons. However, the plea failed to specify any particular person who had been deceived, any particular transaction, or any particular time or place at which the alleged conduct had occurred.
The claimant brought a special demurrer identifying five causes: first, the plea failed to show in what manner the claimant was connected with swindlers; second, it disclosed no particular person with whom he was said to be so connected; third, it disclosed no particular person whom he had allegedly deceived or defrauded; fourth, it stated no day or time when the alleged facts took place; and fifth, the charges were so general and uncertain that the claimant could not know what particular facts the defendant intended to prove at trial, and therefore could not be prepared to disprove them.
The Court of Common Pleas gave judgement for the defendant on the demurrer. The record was subsequently removed into the Court of King's Bench by writ of error, where the errors assigned corresponded closely to the original causes of demurrer.
In argument before the King's Bench, counsel for the defendant contended that the plea could be as general as the declaration itself; that the plaintiff's whole life and character was thereby in issue; that specifying a single instance of fraud would be insufficient, whilst specifying many would risk the entire justification failing if the defendant fell short on any one; that requiring full specification would render the record itself a libel; and that pleas of justification need be drawn with no greater precision than indictments, pointing to the example that charges of barratry or keeping a common bawdy-house could be charged generally. Counsel for the defendant also argued that calling a person a "common informer" is not actionable, that "swindler" is not a legal term of which the law can take notice, and that the innuendos were incapable of enlarging the natural meaning of the words used.
Counsel for the claimant replied that the true purpose of a plea is to disclose to the opposing party the particular facts to be given in evidence, so that they may prepare their answer. On the facts of this case, the plea was so general that the claimant could not know what he was required to disprove. It was further argued that if general calumniation of character were not actionable, any person could scandalise another with impunity.
Held
The Court of King's Bench reversed the judgement of the Court of Common Pleas and found in favour of the claimant. The court held, first, that to print of any person that he is a "swindler" is a libel and actionable. Second, the court held that the defendant's plea of justification was insufficient in law. A plea of justification to a charge of swindling must set out the particular instances of fraud by which the defendant means to support it, specifying the persons deceived, the time, the place, and the manner of the alleged fraud. The court found the defendant's plea, which alleged only that the claimant had fraudulently concerned himself with swindlers and had defrauded divers persons without any further particularity, to be bad on demurrer.
Ratio Decidendi
The ratio of this case comprises two distinct propositions. The first is that publishing of a named person that he is a "swindler" constitutes an actionable libel. The word "swindler," when applied in print to an identified individual, is sufficiently defamatory in its natural meaning to found an action without the need for further extrinsic facts to establish its defamatory character.
The second proposition concerns the pleading requirements for a plea of justification. Where a defendant seeks to justify a libel by asserting that the defamatory charge is true, that plea must be particularised. It is not sufficient to allege, in terms as general as those of the libel itself, that the claimant has been guilty of fraud or has associated with swindlers. The plea must specify the particular persons deceived, the particular transactions relied upon, and the time and place at which each alleged act of fraud occurred. This requirement exists so that the claimant is in a position to know the case he must meet and can come to trial prepared to answer the specific allegations made against him. A plea that fails to achieve this standard is insufficiently certain and will be held bad on demurrer.
Together, these propositions affirm that a defendant cannot escape liability for a serious defamatory publication simply by advancing a justification couched in terms so vague as to provide the claimant with no fair notice of the facts in issue.
Obiter Dicta
The arguments advanced by counsel for the defendant raised several points that did not form part of the court's ultimate holding. In particular, counsel contended that calling a person a "common informer" is not in itself actionable, and that the innuendos pleaded were incapable of enlarging the natural meaning of the words published. These submissions were rejected in the outcome but were not the subject of detailed independent reasoning by the court, and they therefore do not form part of the ratio. They nonetheless illustrate the range of arguments available to defendants in libel actions of this period concerning the actionability of particular words and the function of innuendo in connecting a publication to an identified claimant.