Case Facts
The claimant was the late mayor of the borough of Winchester. Between 17 November 1838 and 2 March 1839, the defendants published a series of articles in the Hampshire Advertiser newspaper imputing to the claimant partial and corrupt conduct, as well as ignorance of his duties, in his capacity as mayor and justice of the peace for the borough. The claimant brought an action in libel in respect of these publications.
At trial before Coleridge J at Winchester Assizes, the jury returned a verdict in favour of the defendants. The claimant's counsel, Erie and Butt, subsequently obtained a rule nisi in Michaelmas Term, seeking a new trial on the grounds that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. The defendants were represented by Crowder, who was not called upon to argue after the court had heard the claimant's counsel. The matter came before the Court of Exchequer of Pleas for determination.
Held
The court held that there had been no misdirection by the trial judge. The direction given by Coleridge J — that there was a distinction with regard to censures applied to public persons as opposed to private individuals — was held to be entirely correct and could not be impugned as a misdirection. Accordingly, the rule absolute for a new trial was granted solely on the ground that the jury's verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence, not on the basis of any error in the judge's legal directions.
The court further confirmed the respective constitutional roles of judge and jury in libel proceedings: the judge is not bound to direct the jury, as a matter of law, that a particular publication is a libel. Rather, the proper function of the judge is to define what constitutes libel in law, and then to leave it to the jury to determine, as a matter of fact, whether the publication in question falls within that definition — including whether it was calculated to injure the character of the claimant.
Ratio Decidendi
The central ratio of this case is the authoritative common law definition of libel, stated in the following terms:
"A publication, without justification or lawful excuse, which is calculated to injure the reputation of another, by exposing him to hatred, contempt, or ridicule, is a libel."
This formulation established the classic common law test for libel and has been applied in numerous subsequent cases, including Sim v Stretch [1936] and Youssoupoff v MGM [1934].
The court also settled a significant procedural principle: in a libel action, the judge defines what constitutes libel as a matter of law, whilst the jury determines whether the publication in question falls within that definition as a matter of fact. The court discussed Libel Act 1792, describing it as a declaratory statute that placed prosecutions for libel on the same footing as other criminal cases, confirming that the judge defines the offence and the jury finds whether it has been committed. Although the Act was expressly confined to criminal proceedings, the court confirmed that the same practice was adopted in civil actions.
Obiter Dicta
The court also addressed the distinction between criticism of public figures acting in a public capacity and criticism of private individuals. The court observed:
"Every subject has a right to comment on those acts of public men which concern him as a subject of the realm, if he do not make his commentary a cloak for malice and slander: but any imputation of wicked or corrupt motives is unquestionably libellous."
The court elaborated upon this point, confirming that criticism may reasonably be applied to a public man in a public capacity that might not justifiably be applied to a private individual, and that the same statement might not constitute a libel upon one person whilst constituting a very grievous libel upon another. However, both judges made clear that this distinction does not create a higher threshold for establishing libel in respect of public officials. The headnote of the report captures the position precisely: a publication may be libellous in respect of a private person that would not be libellous in respect of a person in a public capacity, but any imputation of unjust or corrupt motives is equally libellous in either case.