Case Facts
The claimant, William Tweddle, married the daughter of William Guy. Prior to the marriage, both William Guy (the bride's father) and John Tweddle (the groom's father) made verbal promises to pay certain sums of money to William Tweddle. Following the marriage, on 11 July 1855, the two fathers formalised their arrangement in a written agreement. Under its terms, William Guy promised to pay £200 and John Tweddle promised to pay £100 to William Tweddle, both sums to be paid on or before 21 August 1855.
Crucially, the written agreement contained an express clause stating that William Tweddle had "full power to sue the said parties in any Court of law or equity for the aforesaid sums hereby promised and specified." William Guy died without having paid the £200, and the claimant brought an action against Atkinson, the executor of William Guy's estate, to recover that sum.
Held
The Queen's Bench Division held that the claimant's action was not maintainable. Although the written agreement expressly purported to grant William Tweddle the power to sue, the court found this insufficient to create an enforceable right. The claim failed on two interconnected grounds: first, the claimant had provided no consideration under the contract; and second, he was a stranger to the contract itself. Accordingly, judgement was given for the defendant.
Ratio Decidendi
The ratio of the case rests on two closely related principles of English contract law, both of which defeat the claimant's action.
First, consideration must move from the promisee. A party who has provided no consideration cannot enforce a contractual promise made for his benefit. As Crompton J stated in the clearest terms, "the consideration must move from the party entitled to sue upon the contract." The claimant, William Tweddle, had furnished nothing of value under the agreement — it was his father and his father-in-law who had exchanged promises with one another. He was therefore a stranger to the consideration.
Second, and relatedly, a stranger to a contract cannot take advantage of it, even where the contract was made expressly for his benefit. Wightman J affirmed that "it is now established that no stranger to the consideration can take advantage of a contract, although made for his benefit." He acknowledged that older authorities had appeared to recognise an exception where parties stood in close familial relationships, but concluded that no modern case had sustained such a proposition.
Crompton J reinforced this reasoning by addressing the express power-to-sue clause contained in the written agreement. He described it as a "monstrous proposition to say that a person was a party to the contract for the purpose of suing upon it for his own advantage, and not a party to it for the purpose of being sued." The inclusion of the express clause could not, of itself, confer enforceable rights upon a person who remained a stranger to the consideration. The older decisions that had allowed near-relatives to sue in similar circumstances were expressly overruled.
The argument based on Dutton v Poole (1678) was advanced by counsel for the claimant (Mellish), who contended that an exception existed for contracts made by parents for the benefit of their children. In Dutton v Poole (1678), a daughter and her husband had successfully sued on a promise made to her father. However, the court rejected this line of authority. Crompton J explained that when those earlier cases were decided, the action of assumpsit had been treated as akin to an action of trespass upon the case — in the nature of a tort — and it had not yet been settled either that natural love and affection is not a sufficient consideration, or that a promisee cannot sue unless consideration moved from him. Those principles having since been established, the older cases could no longer be relied upon.
Counsel for the defendant (Edward James) placed reliance on Price v Easton (1833) for the settled proposition that an action for breach of contract must be brought by the person from whom the consideration moved. Blackburn J also noted that the earlier verbal promises described in the declaration might themselves have been actionable, but for s 4 Statute of Frauds 1677, which required certain contracts to be evidenced in writing.
The decision established an important early authority for the doctrine of privity of contract: only a party to a contract may sue upon it. The rule was further consolidated by the House of Lords in Dunlop v Selfridge [1915]. It is important to note, however, that the strict rule as articulated in this case has since been significantly qualified by the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, which permits third parties to enforce contractual terms in defined circumstances — most notably where the contract expressly provides that they may do so, or where the term purports to confer a benefit upon them.
Obiter Dicta
Crompton J observed, in remarks that went beyond what was strictly necessary to decide the case, that at the time the older authorities were decided it had not yet been established that natural love and affection between close relatives does not constitute sufficient consideration. The law had since moved on, and that historical uncertainty could no longer justify departing from the now-settled rules. This observation reinforced the broader principle that familial proximity cannot substitute for the requirement that consideration must move from the party seeking to enforce the contract.